Research 2026-11-17 Decision-making Neuchâtel

Decision-making training in Neuchâtel"I am 90% sure": The origins of overconfidence

"I am 90% sure": The origins of overconfidence — SHR, Neuchâtel
"I am 90% sure": The origins of overconfidence — SHR, Neuchâtel

Before a launch, a manager announces a high probability of success and a tight deadline. A few weeks later, neither holds true. Overconfidence is not a personality trait: it is a measurable gap between what one claims to know and what the facts warranted. A foundational experiment and theoretical synthesis make it possible to separate several phenomena that are often confused.

1. What the literature establishes

Sarah Lichtenstein and Baruch Fischhoff (1977, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance) asked participants to answer general knowledge questions and declare their degree of certainty for each answer. Success rates remained well below declared confidence levels, and the gap widened at the highest levels: even on items where participants claimed to be entirely sure, a significant share of answers was wrong. The authors also show that knowing more about a domain does not improve the ability to assess how much one knows. The study concerns general knowledge, not investment decisions. Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977 — Do those who know more also know more about how much they know?90001-0)

2. The neglected distinction: three different forms of overconfidence

Don A. Moore and Paul J. Healy (2008, Psychological Review) propose a distinction that structures research: overplacement (believing oneself better than average), overprecision (assigning too narrow a margin of error to one's own estimates), and miscalibration (the gap between actual accuracy achieved and announced accuracy). This clarification has practical scope: a person can be perfectly correct in substance yet too precise in how it is asserted. It also prevents reducing everything to alleged ego, since overprecision appears even on judgments with no personal stake. Moore & Healy, 2008 — The trouble with overconfidence

"I am 90% sure": The origins of overconfidence — Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel
"I am 90% sure": The origins of overconfidence — Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel

3. Why detail does not protect

Accumulating analyses increases confidence faster than accuracy. Each additional document makes the narrative more coherent, and a coherent narrative feels well-founded. Overprecision thrives precisely there: a figure rounded to one decimal place, a single delivery date, a scenario without variants. It is not the level of information that protects, but the presence of an external reference: what happened in comparable cases, and what dispersion is observed there.

4. The limits of the data

The Lichtenstein and Fischhoff experiment uses closed questions and laboratory tasks; it does not describe a strategic decision involving multiple people and months. Moore and Healy's synthesis is theoretical: it organizes available concepts and measures, but does not demonstrate that a particular intervention reduces overconfidence. Effects vary across domains—they are weaker in competencies where the person receives rapid and clear feedback. Finally, none of these studies allows us to systematically suspect highly confident people: a good estimate can also be announced with assurance. (our executive and employee training programmes)

5. Defensible conditions for practice

A cautious approach transforms a single statement into a range: request a lower bound, an upper bound, and what would shift the lower bound. It relies on a reference class—comparable cases—rather than on the history of the current file. It explicitly separates what is a factual certainty from what is a forecast. Finally, it keeps a record of past announcements and results, which allows discussing calibration without calling anyone's sincerity into question. These practices translate the distinctions from research; none is a method whose effectiveness the synthesis has demonstrated.

6. A modest test in Neuchâtel

A team in Neuchâtel could review three deadline announcements made during the year and convert them afterward into ranges: what was promised, what was observed, and comparable cases available at the time of promising. It would note whether gaps stem from an initial estimate that was too narrow or from a constraint that emerged later. The exercise remains descriptive and demonstrates no causal effect. It can be discussed in the SHR decision-making training To go further: explore the Decision-making training in Neuchâtel in the canton of Neuchâtel, or browse our executive and employee training programmes in Switzerland.

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Decision-making training in Neuchâtel — in practice
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Decision-making training in Neuchâtel — on the ground

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