Advanced Negotiation training in Lausanne · canton of Vaud"Someone Must Lose": The Fixed Pie Assumption

Before a budget discussion, a manager is convinced that every franc allocated to her department will be taken from elsewhere. This certainty is not a reading of the facts: it precedes the exchange of information. Research calls it the "fixed pie" assumption — the idea that interests are necessarily opposed. Two experiments make it possible to measure its mechanics and to see what contradicts it.
1. What the literature establishes
Leigh Thompson and Reid Hastie (1990, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes) examine social perception in negotiation through dyadic negotiation experiments. They show that negotiators make systematic perceptual errors: they assume that their own preferences are opposed to those of the other party, even when interests are actually compatible. These "representation errors" reduce the probability of mutually beneficial agreements because they discourage exploration. The authors do not claim that all conflicts of interest are imaginary: they demonstrate that opposition is often assumed before being verified. Thompson & Hastie, 1990 — Social perception in negotiation90048-E)
2. The neglected distinction: opposed interests and missing information
Carsten K. W. De Dreu, Sarah L. Koole and Tom W. Steinel (2000, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology) propose an approach based on motivated information processing. In their negotiation experiments, parties oriented toward cooperation or confronted with the consequences of their choices examine available information more thoroughly, including information revealing different preferences on the other side. This exploration enables agreements that would not have been found by discussing only the amount of a single variable. The fixed pie assumption is therefore not inevitable: it loosens when the situation makes information useful and examined. De Dreu, Koole & Steinel, 2000 — Unfixing the fixed pie: A motivated information-processing approach to integrative negotiation

3. Why detail does not protect
Arriving with detailed argumentation does not guarantee that one has sought to understand the other party. An abundantly justified position can even lock down the discussion: every figure presented becomes a commitment to defend rather than a hypothesis to test. The decisive point is not the quantity of data presented, but the existence of information about the preferences, priorities and constraints of both sides — information that the fixed pie assumption renders unnecessary in the eyes of participants, and therefore not requested.
4. The limits of the data
Both articles are based on experimental negotiations, short in duration, between pairs, with stakes set by the researchers. They do not describe long negotiations involving multiple parties, hierarchies or lasting relationships. Measurements concern agreements obtained within the framework of the experiment, not the quality of a relationship afterward or the actual implementation of an agreement. Finally, a real opposition of interests sometimes exists: these works give no reason to systematically deny it. (our executive and employee training programmes)
5. Defensible conditions for practice
A defensible approach consists of distinguishing the position defended from the preference underlying it, and verifying the latter before concluding opposition exists. In practical terms: ask what matters to the other party, in what order and under what conditions; identify multiple variables rather than a single one; and make explicit the constraints that make an option impossible. These actions do not guarantee an agreement — they are not a method validated by both articles — but they make exploration possible where the fixed pie assumption made it unnecessary.
6. A modest test in Lausanne
A team in Lausanne could revisit a budget discussion that ended with an equitable sharing of a single sum. It would list the variables absent from the exchange — timeline, scope, modalities, responsibilities — and wonder which of these could have been proposed without additional cost. The exercise is retrospective and descriptive: it does not measure a gain and does not prove that another outcome was guaranteed. It serves to identify whether information about preferences was lacking, or whether opposition was genuinely present. This work can be prepared in the SHR advanced negotiation training To go further: explore the Advanced Negotiation training in Lausanne in the canton of Vaud, or browse our executive and employee training programmes in Switzerland.
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